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Abstract
In this paper, we acknowledge that the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change
have differential fiscal impacts. Whereas mitigation typically raises fiscal revenues, adapta-
tion is costly to the taxpayer and to a greater extent the more distortionary the tax system
is. In an OLG model with majority voting, we analyze how the choices of mitigation and
adaptation are distorted under a lump-sum and a distortionary income tax regime. We find
that whenever emissions and adaptation exhibit stock characteristics, the levels of mitiga-
tion and adaptation are chosen inefficiently low in the political equilibrium under lump-sum
taxation. By contrast, the political equilibrium may entail inefficiently high mitigation or
inefficiently high adaptation (but not both simultaneously) if the tax system is distortionary.
A calibration of our model to the German economy shows that both mitigation and adap-
tation can be expected to be inefficiently low in the political equilibrium. Furthermore, the
standard assumption of a lump-sum tax system when analyzing mitigation and adaptation is
found to underestimate the loss in utilitarian welfare relative to a distortionary tax system,
although mitigation levels are generally higher under the latter regime.
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1 Introduction
Current climate policies consist of two options: the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions such
as CO2 and the adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change. While the former is able
to raise fiscal revenues (consider an environmental tax or the auctioning of permits under an
emissions trading scheme), public adaptation (dykes against rising sea levels or transport infras-
tructure that is resistant to extreme weather events) requires revenues. It has been estimated
that the costs of public adaptation can be quite significant (see, e.g., Egenhofer et al., 2010;
Jones et al., 2013; Israel, 2013). The fiscal dimension of climate policies has, however, been
largely neglected in economic theory, with the exception of Barrage (2015), and its implications
for the political feasibility of these two options will be explored in this paper.
Mitigation policies have highly differential impacts on individuals with different income levels,
first because they usually affect low-income individuals to a greater extent than high-income
individuals (at least in developed countries, see, e.g., Bach, 2009; Poterba, 1991; Ekins et al.,
2011) but also because any revenues from environmental regulation can be spent on redistribution
between households. In many European countries, e.g., Germany, Sweden, the UK, Denmark
or the Netherlands (see Bosquet, 2000), environmental tax revenues have been used to reduce
income taxes or social security contributions, which partly offsets the regressive impacts of the
tax itself. As these reductions in taxes and contributions are incurred primarily by the working
population and to a much lesser degree by retired individuals, age constitutes a second important
dimension along which differential impacts of climate policy can be observed. Finally, young and
old individuals enjoy different benefits from mitigation policies simply because of their different
time horizons. The young will – on average – benefit more (or longer) from emissions reductions
than the old. The same holds true for expenditures on public adaptation that endure over time,
such as sea walls and transport infrastructure. These two dimensions – different individual
income levels and time horizons – have a significant impact on which policy mix of mitigation
and adaptation is chosen in the political process.
Specifically, we consider an Overlapping Generations (OLG) framework with two generations
alive at each point in time – the young and the old. The young work, whereas the old are retired.
Apart from age, agents differ in their income. They have preferences over a non-dirty (nume´raire)
and a dirty consumption good such as fossil fuels, over the level of emissions (caused by dirty
good consumption) and the level of adaptation investment. All agents vote on the ecotax rate
that applies to consumption of the polluting good and over the level of adaptation investments.
Given this multi-dimensional issue space, we invoke Shepsle’s (1979) concept of structure-induced
equilibria. It separates the bi-dimensional policy space into single dimensions by assuming that
institutions exist that have been assigned the unique power to determine policies related to
their field of responsibility. In our model, the ministry of the environment proposes a green
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tax rate for a given level of adaptation investment, while the ministry of finance suggests a
level of adaptation investment for a given environmental tax rate. These proposals can be
treated as the best responses (reaction functions) of the respective ministries and are rooted
in the median voter’s preferences regarding the issue at stake. Their intersection describes the
structure-induced equilibrium of the voting game.
We compare the political outcome with the choices made by a utilitarian social planner
and find that whether mitigation and adaptation are inefficiently low or high crucially depends
on the characteristics of the underlying tax system. In particular, we consider the two most
prevalent modes of financing – a distortionary income tax system and a lump-sum tax system.
The standard case in the environmental economics literature is the latter because it allows
one to focus on environmental externalities. Compared to that system, distortionary income
taxes are borne mostly by the young generation and necessarily cause efficiency losses. The
mode of financing has a twofold impact on the budget constraints of the agents in our model:
first, through the recycling of ecotax revenue and, second, through the financing of adaptation.
When adaptation is financed and ecotax revenue is recycled through a lump-sum tax system,
both mitigation and adaptation are lower in the political equilibrium than their socially optimal
levels if both policy options exhibit stock characteristics. This is because voters do not internalize
the full marginal damage from the consumption of the polluting good that is imposed on future
generations. If, by contrast, distortionary taxes are in place, the median voter may prefer
inefficiently high mitigation given a sufficiently high income or inefficiently high adaptation
given a sufficiently low income, albeit not both at the same time.
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Although, due to differences in environ-
mental concerns, the social planner internalizes environmental damage to a greater extent than
do individuals, high-income earners benefit more from the regressive nature of ecotaxes relative
to low-income individuals. Namely, the decrease in proportional income taxes caused by the
additional ecotax revenue exceeds the direct costs of the ecotax for high-income individuals.
This fiscal motive due to the recycling of green tax revenue may thus induce the median voter to
choose an inefficiently high level of mitigation. Moreover, the financing of adaptation is relatively
costly for these individuals such that they desire adaptation investments that are inefficiently
low. The reverse case arises when the median voter happens to be a relatively low-income type.
For her, the financial relief from additional ecotax revenue through a cut in distortionary taxes
is small, but the costs of adaptation are also low. Thus, she votes for inefficiently low mitigation
but inefficiently high adaptation investments.
As a consequence, depending on the income of the median voter, mitigation will be higher
and adaptation will be lower under a distortionary tax regime compared with the lump-sum
tax system, or vice versa. The mode of financing thus plays a key role in how society is able
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to combat climate change. Higher mitigation investments may only be politically feasible if the
mode of financing is via distortionary taxes. However, adaptation investments desired by the
decisive voter can be expected to be lower than under lump-sum taxation in this case.
In a calibration of our model to the German economy, we draw some tentative conclusions
on whether mitigation and adaptation levels can be expected to be inefficiently high or low in
reality and whether they are higher or lower under a distortionary tax system relative to a sys-
tem without any fiscal distortions. Furthermore, we compare welfare levels under the different
tax regimes and the social optimum. We find that the political equilibrium under both financ-
ing regimes yields mitigation and adaptation levels that are lower than their socially optimal
levels. However, the relative strength of mitigation and adaptation differs for the two modes
of financing and strongly depends on the distortionary factor of the tax system as measured
by the marginal costs of funds. Although we find higher levels of mitigation for reasonable
parameter estimates of the marginal costs of funds relative to a system of lump-sum taxation,
the deadweight loss entailed by the distortionary tax regime always provokes considerably lower
adaptation investment and lower overall welfare.
Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, it adds to the (theoreti-
cal) literature on mitigation and adaptation. This literature has studied a variety of issues
related to adaptation but is still considered in its infancy. Zehaie (2009), Buob and Stephan
(2011) and Heuson et al. (forthcoming) study the strategic implications of adaptation in non-
cooperative settings. Kane and Shogren (2000), Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009), Ingham et al.
(2007), Auerswald et al. (2011) and Zemel (2015) explore the interactions between mitigation
and adaptation under uncertainty. In Bre´chet et al. (2013), optimal mitigation and adaptation
investments are studied on a macroeconomic level. Analyses of the optimal policy mix in the
context of integrated assessment climate-economy models include Tol (2007), de Bruin et al.
(2009), Bosello et al. (2010), Agrawala et al. (2011) and Felgenhauer and Webster (2013, 2014).
Barrage (2015) acknowledges that distortionary fiscal policy affects the trade-off between mit-
igation and adaptation in a second-best setting. Whereas Barrage studies optimal mitigation
and adaptation policies under distortionary taxation, we argue that the redistributive nature of
the underlying tax system (be it distortionary or not) matters for the political acceptability of
mitigation and adaptation choices. Both margins will likely be distorted because redistribution
occurs within and between generations. A distortionary tax system adds an inefficiency to the
economy but may incentivize the median voter to vote for a higher level of mitigation. How-
ever, although the costs of financing adaptation are higher under distortionary taxes compared
to a lump-sum tax regime, the redistributive properties of the underlying tax system induce
low-income voters to vote for higher adaptation levels.
Second, our paper is related to the literature on the intergenerational aspects of environmen-
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tal policy in an OLG framework (see, e.g., Bovenberg and Heijdra, 1998 and 2002; Chiroleu-
Assouline and Fodha, 2006; or Karp and Rezai, 2014). In these papers, intergenerational conflicts
arise due to differential distributional impacts of environmental policy on the welfare of current
and future generations. In our model, the young and old generations have different preferences
for mitigation and adaptation not only because of their different time horizons but also because
of the different fiscal impacts of these two climate policy options on their respective budget
constraints.
Third, the paper contributes to the literature on the political economy of environmental
policy, which emphasizes the crucial role that the recycling of ecotax revenue plays with respect
to the political feasibility of ecotaxes. Contributions to this literature have been made by
Cremer, De Donder, and Gahvari in a series of papers (Cremer et al., 2004, Cremer et al., 2007,
Cremer et al., 2008) and by Aidt (2010) and Habla and Roeder (2013). In contrast to these
papers, we draw a more realistic picture of climate policy by acknowledging that adaptation
constitutes a second major policy option that is costly to the individual tax-payer. Overall, our
paper is – to the best of our knowledge – the first to address the political economy of mitigation
and adaptation.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
We consider an economy with two generations alive in each period t: the young (superscript ‘Y ’)
and the old (superscript ‘O’). The population grows at a constant rate n > 0, and we normalize
the size of the current old generation to unity. There are thus 1/(1 + n) old agents in each
period, and the overall size of the population is given by 2 + n. The young are in employment
and inelastically supply one unit of labor, earning income yYi,t. The old are retired and receive an
exogenous income of yOi,t, e.g., from pension benefits. The incomes of the young and the old are
distributed over the support [y−, y+] ⊂ R+ according to the cumulative distribution functions
F (yYt ) and F (y
O
t ). Each income distribution is assumed to be right-skewed, F (y¯
Y
t ), F (y¯
O
t ) > 0.5,
implying that median income is below average income. There is no storage technology, and hence
individuals do not save and solely live off their pension benefits in old age. The economy produces
two goods: a clean (non-energy) nume´raire good c and a polluting (energy-related) good d. The
latter is taxed at a rate θt ∈ R. Normalizing the producer price of good d to unity, the consumer
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price amounts to qt = 1 + θt.
1 Aggregate consumption of the polluting good is:
Dt = (1 + n)
∫ y+
y−
dYi,tdF (y
Y
t ) +
∫ y+
y−
dOi,tdF (y
O
t ) . (1)
Note that variation in a single individual’s consumption of the dirty good dji,t (j = Y,O) has no
impact on overall consumption Dt because the mass of one individual is zero. Consumption of
the polluting good causes emissions (one unit of the polluting good equals one unit of emissions)
and contributes to the existing stock of emissions:
Et =
t∑
x=0
(1− δE)
t−xDx = (1− δE)Et−1 +Dt , (2)
which equals current emissions plus aggregate pollution from previous periods, where the latter
is reduced by the natural decay and removal rate δE ∈ [0, 1] per period, which we assume to be
exogenous over time.2 The reader may regard the polluting good as fossil fuels, the consumption
of which generates greenhouse gas emissions and causes global warming. A decay rate equal to
unity implies that pollution does not accumulate over time. The stock of emissions in the
atmosphere generates disutility h(Et, At) in period t for each young and old agent, with hE > 0
and hA < 0. The damage from emissions can be reduced by investing in adaptation at, with the
stock of public adaptation At evolving according to the following:
At = (1− δA)At−1 + v(at) , (3)
where v(at) is a neoclassical production function for adaptation that satisfies the Inada conditions
and δA ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate of adaptation capital per period. For simplicity, we assume
the following functional form:
h(Et, At) = φ× (Et −At) . (4)
This assumption rules out any strategic interdependencies between the mitigation of emissions
and investment in adaptation but captures the stylized fact that the two actions are substitutes
in reducing environmental damage.3
1We perform a partial equilibrium analysis that abstracts from price and wage effects. Equivalently, we could
assume that the two goods are produced by a linear technology subject to constant returns to scale in a competitive
environment.
2In reality, δE varies over time and becomes smaller as natural sinks for greenhouse gases become exhausted,
see Section 6.
3Positive interdependencies arise when, e.g., higher adaptation expenditures lower environmental damage from
emissions. An example are ecosystems that become more resilient to climate change when adaptation is increased.
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The utilities of old and young agents are given by:
UOi,t = c
O
i,t + u(d
O
i,t)− h(Et, At) , (5)
UYi,t = c
Y
i,t + u(d
Y
i,t)− h(Et, At) + ρU
O
i,t+1 , (6)
where 0 < ρ ≤ 1 is the utility discount factor and u denotes utility from dirty good consumption,
which satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and u′′′ > 0. UOi,t+1 is the utility in old age of an individual who is
young at time t. The budget constraints read:
cOi,t + (1 + θt)d
O
i,t = y
O
i,t − τt , (7)
cYi,t + (1 + θt)d
Y
i,t = (1− bt)y
Y
i,t − τt , (8)
with τt being a lump-sum tax and bt being a linear labor income tax (or social security contribu-
tion rate) that is borne solely by the young.4 Assuming an interior solution, optimal consumption
of the polluting good is thus implicitly given by:
1 + θt = u
′(dji,t) ⇒ d
j
i,t = d(θt) ∀ i, t and for j = Y,O. (9)
As ∂d(θt)/∂θt = d
′(θt) = 1/u
′′ < 0, consumption of the polluting good decreases with the
tax rate. Moreover, it is independent of the individual’s income and age. In other words, all
individuals consume the same amount of the energy-related good. This captures – in the most
parsimonious way – the fact that environmental taxation (before redistribution of the associated
revenues) is usually found to be regressive (Poterba, 1991; Ekins et al., 2011).
2.2 The Economic Equilibrium
In an economic equilibrium, public budgets need to be balanced. The government invests in
public adaptation and needs to finance an exogenously given amount of public spending Rt
(transfers, pension payments, etc.).
We consider two financing regimes: first, a regime with lump-sum taxes only, which is the
standard case in the environmental economics literature, and second, the more realistic regime
in which only distortionary income taxes are an available source of revenue for the government.
This allows us to disentangle the effects of the financing regime on the outcome of the political
4Although pension benefits are also subject to income taxation in many countries, these benefits are signifi-
cantly lower than previous incomes from work. Furthermore, tax exemptions often apply such that the effective
tax rate on pension benefits is rather small, and we can safely neglect it in our analysis. In Germany, e.g., only a
quarter of all pension benefits are taxed; see Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2015).
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process. In both regimes, revenue from taxation of the polluting good is given by:
θt(2 + n)d(θt) = θtD(θt) . (10)
Importantly, we assume that ecotax revenue is insufficient to meet the government’s revenue
needs.
2.2.1 Financing by Lump-sum Taxes
In the benchmark case in which lump-sum taxes are at the government’s disposal, the public
budget reads as:
θtD(θt) + (2 + n)τt = Rt + at ⇒ τt(θt, at) =
Rt + at − θtD(θt)
2 + n
. (11)
The lump-sum tax thus depends on the endogenously chosen levels of adaptation and the ecotax
rate. In particular, the following holds:
∂τt(θt, at)
∂θt
= −
D(θt) + θtD
′(θt)
2 + n
, (12)
∂τt(θt, at)
∂at
=
1
2 + n
> 0 . (13)
While an increase in adaptation investment necessarily increases the lump-sum tax for a given
ecotax rate, the first equation is negative whenever the following holds:
D(θt) + θtD
′(θt) = D(θt)(1− εD,θ) > 0 , (14)
where εD,θ = −D
′(θt)θt/D(θt) is the (absolute value of the) demand elasticity of the polluting
good with respect to the tax rate. In other words, whenever consumption of the polluting good is
inelastic, that is, εD,θ smaller than one, the lump-sum tax decreases with the green tax rate. The
intuition is that if a one-percentage-point increase in the green tax aggregate consumption of the
dirty good decreases by less than one percent, this increases positive revenue from taxation. This
revenue can then be used to reduce the lump-sum tax rate while leaving total public expenditure
unchanged.5
Inserting expression (11) into the old’s and young’s utility function yields their indirect
5Several studies that estimate long-run price elasticities of energy demand confirm that εD,θ < 1; see, e.g.,
Hunt and Manning (1989) or Small and Van Dender (2007). Estimates range between 0.1 and 0.9 for different
sources of energy. The average long-run elasticity is thereby found to be 0.58 (Espey, 1996).
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utilities V Oi,t and V
Y
i,t as a function of θt and at:
V Oi,t (θt, at) = y
O
i,t − (1 + θt)d(θt)− τt(θ, at) + u(d(θt))− h(Et(θt), At(at)) , (15)
V Yi,t (θt, at) = y
Y
i,t − (1 + θt)d(θt)− τt(θ, at) + u(d(θt))− h(Et(θt), At(at))
+ ρV Oi,t+1(θt, at) , (16)
where V Oi,t+1 denotes indirect utility of a currently young agent in old age. The latter depends
on the current green tax rate and current adaptation expenditure, as both of these affect the
stocks of emissions and adaptation in period t+ 1 for δE , δA < 1.
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2.2.2 Financing by Distortionary Taxes
To account for the distortionary nature of income taxation, we assume that a fraction η < 1 of
income taxes is lost during the redistributive process (e.g., Galasso and Profeta, 2007; Cremer
et al., 2008).7 The government’s budget in this regime reads as:
θtD(θt) + (1 + n)(1− η)bt
∫ y+
y−
yYi,tdF (y
Y
t ) = Rt + at ⇒ bt(θt, at) =
Rt + at − θtD(θt)
(1 + n)(1− η)y¯Yt
.
(17)
Specifically, the income tax rate that balances public expenditure and ecotax revenue can be
written as a function of θt and at. It adjusts to marginal changes in these variables according
to:
∂bt(θt, at)
∂θt
= −
D(θt)(1− εD,θ)
(1 + n)(1− η)y¯Yt
< 0 , (18)
∂bt(θt, at)
∂at
=
1
(1 + n)(1− η)y¯Yt
> 0 . (19)
Lower ecotax revenue or higher adaptation expenditure thus have to be offset by higher income
tax rates. Note also that a lower population growth rate leads, ceteris paribus, to less ecotax
revenue and lower income tax revenue, which implies that the income tax rate must rise to meet
a given level of expenditure.
Finally, the old’s and young’s indirect utilities in the case of distortionary taxation can be
6Linear damages effectively separate the decisions made in different periods, and therefore, the policy variables
in t+ 1 do not matter for the decision in period t.
7The deadweight loss η is related to the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF) for the income tax system
through η = 1− 1/MCF, that is, a higher MCF entails a larger deadweight loss.
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written as:
V Oi,t (θt, at) = y
O
i,t − (1 + θt)d(θt) + u(d(θt))− h(Et(θt), At(at)) , (20)
V Yi,t (θt, at) = [1− bt(θt, at)]y
Y
i,t − (1 + θt)d(θt) + u(d(θt))− h(Et(θt), At(at))
+ ρV Oi,t+1(θt, at) . (21)
The above indirect utility functions of an i-type young and old agent can be used to express
their preferences for the green tax rate and public adaptation in economic equilibrium. Both
policy variables are determined in the political process described in Section 4.
3 Social Optimum
In this section, we analyze the optimal levels of the green tax rate and public adaptation that
would be chosen by a utilitarian social planner. This provides a benchmark against which the
results of the political outcome can be assessed.
At time t, the social planner accounts for the welfare of all generations from t to infinity,
that is, for the current old plus all current and future young generations.8 The welfare function
can be written as a function of the policy variables of time t:
Wt(θt, at) =
∫ y+
y−
V Oi,t (θt, at)dF (y
O
t )+
(1 + n)
∞∑
x=t
(
(1 + n)ρ
)x−t ∫ y+
y−
∫ y+
y−
V Yi,x(θt, at)dF (y
Y
x )dF (y
O
x+1) , (22)
where we omit future policy variables for the same reason as above. Note that with a utilitarian
welfare function and quasi-linear preferences, redistributive considerations within and between
generations do not matter – all agents have a constant marginal utility of income equal to one.
Because the income tax scheme entails distortions and redistributive concerns are not present,
it is always optimal to finance at and Rt by lump-sum taxes.
The first-order condition of (22) with respect to θt reduces to:
−D(θt)− (2 + n)
∂τt
∂θt
−
2 + n
1− zE
φD′(θt) = 0 ⇔ θ
⋆
t =
2 + n
1− zE
φ , (23)
where zE ≡ ρ(1 + n)(1 − δE) and ρ(1 + n) < 1 for the infinite sum of marginal environmental
damages to converge. That is, the social planner weighs the marginal costs to society of increas-
8We do not distinguish between private discount rates used by one generation to discount their lifetime utility
and the social discount rate at which the social planner trades off the weighted lifetime utility of different gener-
ations. See Schneider et al. (2012) on intergenerational trade-offs in OLG models and models with an infinitely
lived agent.
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ing the green tax rate (the first term in the equation to the left) against the marginal benefits
of a lower lump-sum tax due to revenue recycling (second term) and of reduced environmental
damage (third term). At the optimum, the social planner sets the tax rate equal to the present
value of marginal environmental damages (Pigouvian tax).
The first-order condition with respect to at can be written as:
9
−(2 + n)
∂τt
∂at
+
2 + n
1− zA
φv′(at) = 0 ⇔
2 + n
1− zA
φv′(a⋆t ) = 1 , (24)
where zA ≡ ρ(1 + n)(1 − δA) and again ρ(1 + n) < 1 for convergence of the infinite sum of
marginal environmental damages. The social planner thus equates the present value of the
marginal environmental benefits of adaptation with its marginal costs, which equal unity. This
is the usual Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of public goods.
4 Political Process
In each period, the young and old vote on the green tax rate θt and on public adaptation expen-
diture at (repeated voting), and they do so sincerely. Agents’ preferences over the two policy
variables are aggregated through a political system of majoritarian voting. Each individual has
zero mass, and hence no individual vote can change the outcome of the election.
We examine structure-induced equilibria (SIE) as developed by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle
(1979). Agents are assumed to vote simultaneously but separately on the issues at stake.10
The political system is characterized by the following institutional arrangement. An elected
government perfectly represents the preferences of the whole electorate – the young and the old.
The policy issues at stake are assigned to perfectly representative ministries. In particular, the
ministry of environment proposes an ecotax rate for any given level of adaptation, while the
ministry of finance suggests a level of adaptation for any given environmental tax rate. Proposals
are rooted in the median voter’s preferences over the issue at stake and can be regarded as the
best responses or reaction functions of the ministries. Their intersection characterizes the SIE
of the voting game in which the ministries’ policy proposals are mutual best responses to one
another. The SIE thus introduces issue-by-issue voting and retains the median voter approach
in a multi-dimensional issue space.
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 specify every voter’s ideal point with respect to the green tax rate and
9Both second-order conditions can be shown to hold; see Appendix A.1.
10Alternatively, our setting could be framed such that decisions are made sequentially. The natural first stage
would then be the decision on the ecotax rate, which specifies the mitigation effort, while adaptation expenditure
would be determined in the second stage. As will be shown below, the reaction functions are horizontal and vertical
lines, respectively. This is due to our assumption that hEA = 0 and implies that mitigation and adaptation are
not strategic substitutes (or complements). However, this also means that the outcome of this sequential game
(and of the game in reverse order) coincides with the SIE.
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public adaptation under the two financing regimes. At the end of each section, the median voter
is identified, and the outcome of the political process as measured by the SIE under each regime
is compared to the social optimum. In Section 4.3, we compare the outcomes of the different
regimes with one another.
4.1 Voting with Lump-sum Taxes
If lump-sum taxes are available, an old or young individual of type i finds her preferred green
tax rate, θOi,t or θ
Y
i,t, by maximizing indirect utility, equations (15) and (16), with respect to θt.
The first-order conditions are given by:
∂V Oi,t
∂θt
= −d(θt)−
∂τt
∂θt
− φD′(θt) = 0 , (25)
∂V Yi,t
∂θt
= −d(θt)−
∂τt
∂θt
− φD′(θt)[1 + ρ(1− δE)] = 0 . (26)
For δE < 1, these optimal conditions differ only in the last term. The first term in each equation
describes the individual’s direct cost of higher green taxes in terms of higher expenditure, while
the second term describes the marginal benefit of higher ecotaxes in terms of a lower lump-sum
tax associated with the recycling of ecotax revenue. Finally, the third term is the marginal
benefit of higher green taxes in terms of lower environmental damage in period t, where the
young generation benefits from this reduction also in period t + 1 (for δE < 1). The preferred
tax rate for each generation balances these trade-offs. The second-order conditions hold (see
Appendix A.1).
When maximizing indirect utility with respect to at, we obtain the following first-order
conditions for an old and a young individual of type i:
∂V Oi,t
∂at
= −
∂τt
∂at
+ φv′(at) = 0 , (27)
∂V Yi,t
∂at
= −
∂τt
∂at
+ φv′(at)[1 + ρ(1− δA)] = 0 , (28)
which yield the optimal choices aOi,t and a
Y
i,t. Similar to the indirect utility case, for δA < 1,
only the last term differs across generations because of the different time horizons of old and
young individuals. It measures the marginal environmental benefit from adaptation investment
that accrues to both generations in period t but continues to have an effect in period t + 1 for
the young generation. The first term in each equation is the marginal cost to each individual
of higher adaptation investment in terms of a higher lump-sum tax. Again, the second-order
conditions are strictly negative (Appendix A.1).
It is straightforward to derive the following lemma.
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Figure 1: Political equilibrium under lump-sum taxation.
Lemma 1 (The old’s and young’s preferred mitigation & adaptation levels)
When lump-sum taxes are in place, the old will – for δE , δA < 1 – always prefer both a lower
green tax rate and lower adaptation investment relative to individuals of the young generation.
This is simply because the young have a longer time horizon and thus appreciate an investment
that endures over time to a greater extent than do the old. In the special case of 100% depre-
ciation of pollution and adaptation per period, the old’s and young’s optimal mitigation and
adaptation choices coincide.
Individuals can be ordered according to their age, with respect to both policy instruments,
as illustrated by Figure 1, and the median voter(s) can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 2 (The median voter(s) under lump-sum taxation)
In the case of lump-sum taxation, and for n > 0, the median voter along both dimensions is a
young individual (of any income). Her preferred levels of the green tax rate and the adaptation
investment under lump-sum taxation are denoted θτM,t and a
τ
M,t, respectively.
Note that although the median voters along both dimensions are – unlike in Figure 1 – not
necessarily identical and may dispose of different incomes, their optimal choices do not differ
from those of other young voters. Furthermore, due to the assumption that the cross-partial
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derivative of the damage function is zero, the optimal choices of all individuals and hence of
the median voter(s) are independent of the choice of the other policy variable; see equations
(26) and (28). In other words, the reaction functions of the median voter(s) with respect to
mitigation and adaptation choices are vertical and horizontal lines, respectively, which leads us
to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness of SIE under lump-sum taxation)
There exists a unique SIE, (θτM,t, a
τ
M,t), under lump-sum taxation. It is characterized by equations
(26) and (28).
Evaluating the social planner’s optimal conditions with respect to the green tax rate and
adaptation investment, equations (23) and (24), at the median voter’s preferred levels, given by
equations (26) and (28), yields:
∂W
∂θt
∣∣∣∣
θt=θτM,t
= −(2 + n)φD′(θτM,t)
zE
1− zE
[
1−
1− zE
1 + n
]
≥ 0 ⇒ θτM,t ≤ θ
∗
t , (29)
∂W
∂at
∣∣∣∣
at=aτM,t
= (2 + n)φv′(aτM,t)
zA
1− zA
≥ 0 ⇒ aτM,t ≤ a
∗
t , (30)
which we summarize in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Inefficiently low mitigation & adaptation under lump-sum taxation)
When financing is by lump-sum transfers, then both the ecotax rate and adaptation investments
are – for δE , δA < 1 – too low in the political equilibrium relative to their social optimum.
This is not particularly surprising because the social planner also accounts for, in contrast to
the median voter(s) at time t, how mitigation and adaptation choices at time t affect all future
generations’ welfare through reduced environmental damage. For the special case of δE = δA = 1,
the choices in the political equilibrium coincide with the first-best.
4.2 Voting with Distortionary Taxes
In the case of distortionary income taxation, the first-order conditions of an old and a young
individual of type i with respect to the green tax rate are – using equations (20) and (21) –
given by:
∂V Oi,t
∂θt
= −d(θt)− φD
′(θt) = 0 , (31)
∂V Yi,t
∂θt
= −d(θt)− φD
′(θt)[1 + ρ(1− δE)]−
∂bt
∂θt
yYi,t = 0 . (32)
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The first term in both equations illustrates the marginal costs of a tax increase as described in
the previous section. The second term measures the marginal environmental benefit of higher
ecotaxes, which is – for δE < 1 – higher for an individual of the young generation. The last
term in equation (32) describes the marginal benefit for the young generation in terms of lower
distortionary taxes due to revenue recycling. If the second-order conditions hold, as we assume
(see Appendix A.1), it is clear that the young obtain greater benefits from a marginal ecotax
increase but the same costs. Therefore, they always prefer a higher ecotax rate than do the old.
However, in contrast to the old and in contrast to the case of lump-sum taxation, their preferred
ecotax rate depends on their income. Specifically, ∂θYi,t/∂y
Y
i,t > 0.
Finally, the first-order conditions of an old and a young individual of type i with respect to
adaptation investments yield (the second-order conditions can be shown to hold, see Appendix
A.1):
∂V Oi,t
∂at
= φv′(at) > 0 , (33)
∂V Yi,t
∂at
= φv′(at)[1 + ρ(1− δA)]−
∂bt
∂at
yYi,t = 0 . (34)
The old thus prefer – independent of their income – as much adaptation as possible, up to the
point at which the marginal productivity of adaptation becomes zero. The reason is that they
do not contribute to the provision of adaptation under this regime. The young, by contrast,
benefit – for δA < 1 – from higher adaptation through lower environmental damage in periods
t and t + 1. Moreover, a higher adaptation investment increases the distortionary income tax,
which is harmful to young agents and does so to a greater extent the higher is their income
(the last term in equation (34)). Therefore, ∂aYi,t/∂y
Y
i,t < 0. Old agents thus always prefer
higher adaptation investment relative to the young. We can summarize our findings for the
distortionary tax regime in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (The old’s and young’s preferred mitigation & adaptation levels)
When distortionary taxes are in place, the old prefer a lower green tax rate but higher adaptation
investment compared to the young generation.
To characterize the political equilibrium, voters can be ordered according to their age and
income, as illustrated by Figure 2.
Lemma 4 (The median voter under distortionary taxation)
In the case of distortionary taxation, and for n > 0, the median voter along both dimensions is
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Figure 2: Political equilibrium under distortionary taxation.
a young individual whose income is determined by the following equation:
1 + (1 + n)F (yYM,t) =
2 + n
2
⇔ F (yYM,t) =
n
2(1 + n)
. (35)
Her preferred levels of the green tax rate and the adaptation investment under distortionary
taxation are denoted θbM,t and a
b
M,t, respectively.
Note that the income of the median voter lies below the young’s median income.
Again, equations (32) and (34) ensure that the reaction functions of the median voter with
respect to mitigation and adaptation choices are vertical and horizontal, respectively, which
leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness of SIE under distortionary taxation)
Assuming that the median voter’s second-order condition with respect to θt holds, there exists a
unique SIE, (θbM,t, a
b
M,t), under distortionary taxation, which is characterized by equations (32)
and (34), both evaluated at the median voter’s level of income yYM,t.
Evaluating the social planner’s optimal condition with respect to the green tax rate and
adaptation investment, equations (23) and (24), at the median voter’s preferred levels, equation
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(32) and (34), yields:
∂W
∂θt
∣∣∣∣
θt=θbM,t
= D(θt)(1− εD,θ)
[
1−
(2 + n)yYM,t
(1 + n)(1− η)y¯t
]
− φD′(θt)
zE(n+ zE)(2 + n)
(1− zE)(1 + n)
, (36)
∂W
∂at
∣∣∣∣
at=abM,t
= −1 +
(2 + n)yYM,t
(1− zA)(1 + ρ(1− δA))(1− η)y¯t
. (37)
Both equations can be positive or negative. It is straightforward to show that:
θbM,t R θ
∗
t ⇔ y
Y
M,t R
[
1−
zE
1− zE
φD′(θt)(n+ zE)
(1 + n)d(θt)(1− εD,θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
1 + n
2 + n
(1− η)y¯t , (38)
abM,t R a
∗
t ⇔ y
Y
M,t ⋚ (1− zA)(1 + ρ(1− δA))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
1 + n
2 + n
(1− η)y¯t , (39)
which implies that even for δE = δA = 1, efficiency will not prevail in the political equilibrium.
We characterize the efficiency properties of the SIE in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Efficiency properties of SIE under distortionary taxation)
In the case of distortionary taxation, the median voter prefers inefficiently high mitigation for
sufficiently high income or inefficiently high adaptation for sufficiently low income but not both
simultaneously. For intermediate values of income, she may desire both inefficiently low mitiga-
tion and inefficiently low adaptation (as in the case of lump-sum taxation).
The intuition for why the median voter may prefer inefficiently high mitigation is that, due to
the regressive nature of the ecotax, she may benefit more from an increase in the ecotax and –
as a quid pro quo – from a lower income tax if she is wealthy enough relative to the voter with
average income. In this case, the proportional decrease in the income tax plus the environmental
benefit of a higher ecotax exceed the less than proportional increase in ecotax payments. In other
words, although the median voter cares less about damages than does the social planner, the
fiscal motives arising from the revenue recycling of the ecotax and the associated redistribution
are sufficiently strong to induce her to vote for inefficiently high mitigation. By contrast, when
the income of the median voter is sufficiently low relative to average income, inefficiently high
adaptation is chosen in the political equilibrium because the associated increase in proportional
income taxes is outweighed by the gain in environmental quality due to higher adaptation (the
latter is the same for all individuals). In Section 6, we will examine whether and when emissions
net of adaptation, Et−At, are inefficiently high or low in the political equilibrium. In addition,
we will analyze whether and when utilitarian welfare under income taxation is higher compared
to lump-sum taxation despite the distortions in the tax system.
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4.3 Comparison of SIE under the Different Financing Regimes
We can also compare the outcomes of the political process under the different financing regimes.
The median voters under the two regimes may differ. However, in the lump-sum taxation case,
the median voter under the distortionary tax system prefers the same mitigation and adaptation
levels as all agents of her generation. Therefore, we evaluate the first-order condition of the
median voter under distortionary taxation, equations (32) and (34), at her preferred levels of
mitigation and adaptation under lump-sum taxation, (26) and (28), respectively, (and not vice
versa):
∂V bM,t
∂θt
∣∣∣∣
θt=θτM,t
= −D(θt)(1− εD,θ)
[
1
2 + n
−
yYM,t
(1 + n)(1− η)y¯Yt
]
, (40)
∂V bM,t
∂at
∣∣∣∣
at=aτM,t
=
[
1
2 + n
−
yYM,t
(1 + n)(1− η)y¯Yt
]
. (41)
Clearly, both equations can be positive or negative, but if one is positive, the other is negative,
and vice versa. This implies:
θτM,t R θ
b
M,t ⇔ a
τ
M,t ⋚ a
b
M,t ⇔ y
Y
M,t ⋚
1 + n
2 + n
(1− η)y¯Yt , (42)
and leads us to the following corollary.
Corollary 3 (Comparison of SIE)
Distortionary taxation will induce a median voter with an income higher (lower) than (1+n)(1−
η)y¯Yt /(2 + n) to choose higher (lower) mitigation and lower (higher) adaptation relative to the
case under the lump-sum tax regime. If his income equals (1+n)(1−η)y¯Yt /(2+n), his marginal
incentives to vote are aligned under both regimes.
The intuition for the knife-edge case of identical choices under both regimes is that any increase
in the lump-sum tax due to higher adaptation (respectively, a lower green tax rate), which
imposes costs of 1/(2 + n) on all individuals, is exactly the equal for a median voter with this
particular income level as the increase in the distortionary income tax for the same purpose.
5 Comparative Statics
Two key parameters upon which our above results hinge are demography in the form of the
population growth rate and the efficiency of the income tax system as measured by the marginal
cost of funds. Subsequently, we will analyze the effects of marginal changes in these parameters
on the first-best outcome and the political equilibrium.
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5.1 Demographic Change
Demography plays an important role in our model. Not only does it directly affect the political
outcome by determining the median voter, it also indirectly affects the political equilibrium
by changing individuals’ preferences. In this section, we analyze the impact of a (permanent)
change in n on the levels of mitigation and adaptation chosen by voters and the social planner.
We focus on young voters, as the median voter will continue to be part of the young generation
as long as n > 0.11 Assuming that the income distribution as a whole remains unaffected by
population growth, we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Mitigation, adaptation and demographic change)
The following conditions hold for the optimal levels of mitigation and adaptation:
∂θ∗t
∂n
=
1− ρ(1− δE)
(1− zE)2
φ > 0 ,
∂a∗t
∂n
= −
1−ρ(1−δA)
(1−zA)2
φv′(a∗t )
SOCa∗
> 0 , (43)
∂θY,τi,t
∂n
=
φd′(θ)(1 + ρ(1− δE))
SOCYθτ
> 0 ,
∂aY,τi,t
∂n
=
∂2τt
∂at∂n
SOCYaτ
> 0 , (44)
∂θY,bi,t
∂n
=
φd′(θ)(1 + ρ(1− δE)) +
∂2bt
∂θt∂n
yYi,t
SOCY
θb
R 0 ,
∂aY,bi,t
∂n
=
∂2bt
∂at∂n
yYi,t
SOCY
ab
> 0 , (45)
where ∂2τt/(∂at∂n) = −1/(2+n)
2 < 0, ∂2bt/(∂θt∂n) =
(
d(θt)+θtd
′(θt)
)
/
(
(1+n)2(1−η)y¯Yt
)
> 0
and ∂2bt/(∂at∂n) = −1/
(
(1 + n)2(1− η)y¯Yt
)
< 0.
Obviously, a lower population growth rate decreases the socially optimal ecotax and adapta-
tion investments because less of the environmental damage needs to be internalized. A similar
reasoning applies to the young’s desired levels of adaptation and mitigation. Under lump-sum
taxation, they choose a lower ecotax and lower adaptation investments with a lower n because
otherwise the same environmental damage would affect fewer individuals. This also holds in the
political equilibrium. Graphically, the horizontal lines in Figure 1 indicating the voters’ optimal
choices would, in parallel, shift downward for the green tax rate and upward for the level of
adaptation (for both generations). If, by contrast, distortionary taxes are in place, a second
effect appears that makes the young’s and thus the median voter’s reaction to a decrease in n
with respect to the ecotax ambiguous. To observe the intuition underlying this effect, note that
∂2bt/∂θt∂n > 0, that is, a lower n (higher bt) makes ecotax increases more effective in reducing
distortionary taxes and thus increases the attractiveness of the ecotax rate for any given income
of a young individual. Depending on the relative strength of the two effects at work, the young’s
preferred level of mitigation may rise or fall. The effects are illustrated in Figure 3.
11The comparative statics with respect to the choices of old voters can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 3: Effects of lower population growth under distortionary taxa-
tion.
Additionally, a decrease in the population growth rate increases the share of the old. While
this has no bearing in the case of lump-sum taxes, it does have an effect in the presence of
distortionary taxes; namely, the median voter shifts to a young agent of lower income. This
effect (indicated by the horizontal arrow in Figure 3) mitigates the positive effect described
above because lower income individuals prefer lower ecotax rates. While the mitigation level
in the political equilibrium may rise or fall, the adaptation investment unambiguously falls.
Furthermore, in the first-best and under lump-sum taxation, lower ecotaxes and adaptation
investment imply that environmental damage caused by Et − At increases, while this is not as
clear in the case of distortionary taxation.
5.2 The Deadweight Loss of Taxation
If the economy becomes more efficient, i.e., the marginal costs of funds marginally fall, we
naturally observe effects only in the case of distortionary taxation. The social optimum and
the political equilibrium under lump-sum taxation remain unaffected. Furthermore, as the old
are not contributing to the distortionary tax system, their choices also remain the same. In
particular, we have:
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Lemma 6 (Mitigation, adaptation and changes in η)
The following conditions hold for the equilibrium levels of mitigation and adaptation:
∂θbM,t
∂η
= −
D(θt)(1−εD,θ)
(1+n)(1−η)2y¯Yt
yYM,t
SOCY
θb
> 0 ,
∂abM,t
∂η
=
1
(1+n)(1−η)2y¯Yt
yYM,t
SOCY
ab
< 0 . (46)
A decline in η will reduce the mitigation and increase the adaptation chosen by young voters
and thus by the median voter. The intuition is that a decrease in η makes the recycling of
ecotax revenue in the form of lower income taxes less attractive for young voters of any income
because any given income tax now entails less distortion. For the same reason, it becomes – for
any income level – more attractive to finance adaptation investments. A lower deadweight loss
of taxation is thus favorable to adaptation investment at the cost of a lower green tax rate in
the political equilibrium. Whether emissions net of adaptation, Et −At, rise or fall depends on
the specific parameter constellation.
6 Numerical Illustration and Welfare Analysis
In this section, we illustrate our results numerically by calibrating the model to the German
economy of the year 2010 (for reasons of data availability), i.e., for the year 2010, t = 1. This
exercise allows us to draw some tentative conclusions on whether mitigation and adaptation levels
can be expected to be inefficiently high or low in reality and whether they are higher or lower
under a distortionary tax system relative to one without any fiscal distortions. Furthermore, we
compare welfare levels under the different tax regimes and the social optimum. In this sense,
the following analysis can be understood as an initial stage in which a constitutional planner (as
in Cremer et al., 2000) chooses the regime that maximizes overall welfare, given that mitigation
and adaptation levels are determined by majority voting.
Individual data on the distribution of taxable labor income (on an annual basis) were ob-
tained from the Federal Statistical Office in Germany. Data on population size were taken from
the OECD population statistics database. To compute n, we divide the number of retired indi-
viduals above the age of 65 (16 873 018 people) by the number of working individuals between
the ages of 20 and 64 (49 693 261 people). The pensioner/contributor ratio 1/(1 + n) is 0.34,
and thus, n equals 1.95. One period in our model corresponds to 45 years. By equation (36), we
have F (yYM,1) = 0.33, which yields y
Y
M,1=11 570e.
12 Average income levels for the young and
12Our income data contain the income of only those individuals who submitted an annual tax declaration. This
ignores approximately 7 mio. individuals. We assign these missing income data in such a way that the relative
shares within each income interval remain constant. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis and assign the missing
income data to only the lower half of the income distribution because the low income agents are less likely to gain
from submitting their tax declaration. Our results are qualitatively robust to this change.
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old are y¯O1 =14 000e and y¯
Y
1 =22 700e.
13
We assume a logarithmic utility function (for which all second-order conditions outlined in
the Appendix hold) and a logarithmic adaptation production function:14
u
(
d(θt)
)
= x+ ω ln
(
d(θt)
)
, v(at) = γ ln(at). (47)
The parameter values δE , δA, ρ and η are based on estimates in the literature. It is a challenge
to combine estimates for the uptake of anthropogenic CO2 by biological and abiological sinks
into a single parameter.15 The IPCC (2007) states in the “Executive Summary” of Chapter
7: “About half of a CO2 pulse to the atmosphere is removed over a timescale of 30 years; a
further 30% is removed within a few centuries; and the remaining 20% will typically stay in
the atmosphere for many thousands of years.” As one period in our model corresponds to 45
years, we take the IPCC’s estimate as a lower bound. For public adaptation, we take implicit
scrapping rates for net government capital stocks in the US as a reference point. Those have
been estimated at approximately 4% per year (Kamps, 2006), which implies a δA of 0.84. This
is close to what Agrawala et al. (2011) and Felgenhauer and Webster (2013) use in their studies
(5% depreciation per year). We are restricted by the condition ρ(1 + n) < 1, that is, ρ < 0.34
for the n we employ. Using a discount rate of 3% per year as in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000),
we find ρ = 0.264 < 0.33.16 Kleven and Kreiner (2003, 2006) estimate the marginal costs of
public funds for Germany and report a lower bound of 1.55 for a proportional tax reform. For
our modeling framework, this implies an η of 0.37 (see fn. 7). As the distortionary tax system
is at the heart of this analysis, we perform some sensitivity analyses by varying η from 0.17 to
0.57.
We calibrate the remaining parameters such that the model produces
1. an increase in the stock of emissions Et in the first period (t = 1) relative to the initial stock,
i.e., E1/E0, which is equivalent to the observed increase over the last 45 years. According
to measurements of annual mean CO2 concentrations at Mauna Loa, the concentration
rose from 318.50 ppm (parts per million) in 1962 to 383.79 ppm in 2007, i.e., by 20.50%
13Because these data are computed on an annual basis, we have to multiply each income level by 45 to account
for our two-generations framework.
14The parameter x > 0 is set such that the welfare of future generations does not immediately become negative
when d falls toward zero (this is because θ has to rise due to population growth. Otherwise, environmental damage
would rise excessively). For convenience, we set x = Rt = 10 000, both of which we assume to be time-invariant.
15Long-term biological sinks for greenhouse gases are dissolution in the oceans and chemical neutralization
by reaction with carbonates and basic igneous rocks. The uptake capacity is reservoir-specific and depends on
the state of the system, i.e., on the initial level and the additional flux of greenhouse gases released into the
atmosphere; see Archer et al. (1997).
16Nordhaus (2007) argues that information on intertemporal preferences can be inferred from observations of
investment decisions on capital markets and, therefore, that a positive discount rate can be employed. Note that
in our model, the discount rate is equal to the rate of pure time preference because the growth rate of per capita
GDP is equal to zero.
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Social Lump-sum Distortionary taxes
Optimum taxes η = 0.17 η = 0.27 η = 0.37 η = 0.47 η = 0.57
θ1 97.04 67.07 66.89 67.01 67.15 67.36 67.66
a1 3 384 3 088 1 273 1 120 966 812 659
E1 2 483 3 026 3 030 3 027 3 024 3 018 3 011
A1 406 402 357 351 344 335 325
E1 −A1 2 077 2 624 2 673 2 676 2 680 2 683 2 686
b1 - - 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.26
τ1 84 493 84 555 - - - - -
V Y1 (×10
4) 526.80 527.56 518.79 513.29 506.05 496.09 481.52
V O1 (×10
4) 110.95 111.24 119.63 119.62 119.61 119.59 119.58
W (×105) 230.30 229.88 226.76 224.28 221.03 216.54 209.98
Table 1: Social optimum and political equilibria under the different regimes for the year 2010.
(see IPCC, 2015);
2. a politically determined tax rate that approximately equals the actual German ecotax rate
on gasoline (65e per tonne of CO2), i.e., φ = 15;
3. a tax rate b that is in a plausible range for Germany (the all-in average personal income tax
rates at the average wage vary between 21 and 39% for different family types in Germany
according to the OECD, 2015);17
4. the annual (not per period) consumption of the polluting good is equivalent to the annual
CO2 emissions per capita in Germany: approximately 10 tonnes in 2010 according to PBL
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and the Institute for Environment and
Sustainability of the European Commissions Joint Research Centre (2014);
5. a reduction of damages through the use of adaptation of approximately 10%. This implies
a γ of 50.
For the calculation of all future generations’ welfare, we need to take into account that the
future levels of mitigation and adaptation change over time under all regimes and in the social
optimum due to population growth. For details, the reader is referred to the Appendix.
Table 1 presents our simulation results. The political equilibrium under both financing
regimes yields mitigation and adaptation levels that are lower than their socially optimal levels.
This necessarily entails lower welfare in the political equilibrium. However, the relative strength
of mitigation and adaptation differs between the two modes of financing. While the equilibrium
17Note that ecotax revenue in Germany is recycled through cuts in pension contribution rates; see
Habla and Roeder (2013) for further details. For our analysis, it does not make any difference whether the
ecotax revenue is used to reduce income tax or social security contribution rates except that the income tax
scheme is progressive in Germany whereas the social security scheme is proportional/ linear.
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Social Lump-sum Distortionary taxes
Optimum taxes η = 0.17 η = 0.27 η = 0.37 η = 0.47 η = 0.57
θ1 48.90 43.81 43.47 43.56 43.68 43.84 44.09
a1 2 073 2 017 1 925 1 693 1 461 1 229 997
E1 2 832 3 012 3 025 3 022 3 017 3 010 3 001
A1 382 380 378 372 364 336 345
E1 −A1 2 450 2 631 2 647 2 650 2 653 2 655 2 656
b1 - - 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.44 0.54
τ1 145 240 145 280 - - - - -
V Y1 (×10
4) 273.69 273.74 257.59 251.42 243.29 232.09 215.70
V O1 (×10
4) 106.38 106.44 120.96 120.95 120.94 120.93 120.91
W (×105) 57.234 57.226 55.91 54.85 53.46 51.54 48.73
Table 2: Social optimum and political equilibria under the different regimes for the year 2055.
ecotax is lower under distortionary taxation for a low η (and slightly higher for a higher η),
adaptation investment in this regime falls short of the equilibrium investment under lump-
sum taxation. In line with Lemma 6, the ecotax rate rises and adaptation investments fall
with a higher η. When the marginal costs of public funds increase, mitigation investments
become slightly higher while adaptation investments become lower than under the lump-sum
tax regime; see equation (43). Nevertheless, even higher mitigation levels under the distortionary
tax regime are not sufficient to provoke lower environmental damages because of significantly
lower adaptation investments. The additional distortions of the income tax scheme also weigh on
aggregate welfare. While the young would always be better off under a lump-sum tax regime on
average, the reverse holds for the old generation. This is simply because all individuals contribute
under lump-sum taxation, which decreases the young’s and increases the old’s financial burden.
Aggregate welfare is only slightly lower under lump-sum taxation relative to that under the
social optimum but significantly lower under all distortionary tax regimes.
To illustrate numerically the role of demographic change in our model, we assume that n
decreases (permanently) from 1.95 to 0.58 as projected by the OECD for the year 2055. As
we cannot reasonably speculate about technologies and income distributions in 2055, we hold
all else constant at 2010 levels. The first effect of this change in n is that the median voter’s
income is now determined by F (yYM,1) = 0.18, which yields y
Y
M,1=7 650e. Table 2 shows that
– compared to before – mitigation levels decrease in the social optimum and under the two
financing regimes. For adaptation investments, however, a different picture emerges. Those are
now lower in the social optimum and under a lump-sum tax regime compared to the higher n
from before but higher than before under distortionary taxation. The reason is that the median
voter effect now dominates: although the preferred adaptation investments of the young decline
with demographic change (see equation 44), the median voter’s preferences move closer to those
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of old agents, who prefer higher adaptation. Ultimately, mitigation and adaptation levels do
not differ as much as they did previously. Quantitatively, our main results do not change.
The lump-sum tax scheme still outperforms the distortionary tax scheme both with respect to
emissions net of adaptation and total welfare. Again, the loss in utilitarian welfare would be
largely underestimated in the lump-sum tax regime.
7 Discussion
We have made some simplifying assumptions that merit further discussion regarding the robust-
ness of our results.
7.1 Damage Function
To obtain analytical solutions, we restricted environmental damages to be linear (as in Habla
and Roeder, 2013). This helps us to focus on the single-country case and avoids complications
regarding expectations of future tax rates that necessarily depend on the stock of emissions and
adaptation capital. In the case of convex damages, we would have had to derive Markov-perfect
equilibria of this voting game, which is a nearly impossible task, given the complexity of the
model in other respects. Convex damages and the associated positive cross-partial derivative
of the damage function with respect to mitigation and adaptation would make the two options
strategic substitutes. Increased mitigation would automatically imply lower adaptation, and
vice versa. We argue that this would only weaken our obtained results quantitatively, not
qualitatively.
7.2 Public Budgets
We have assumed that lump-sum taxes are borne by all generations – the young and the old.
This is an asymmetry relative to the distortionary tax regime, under which only the young
contribute to the financing of the public budget. However, even if the young were to carry the
burden of a lump-sum tax alone, this would not change our results qualitatively. The old would
prefer an even lower ecotax compared to the young because they would not benefit from revenue
recycling through a lower lump-sum tax (see equation 25), but they would vote for a level of
adaptation that is as high as possible (equation 27). By contrast, a higher ecotax would become
more attractive for the young generation due to revenue recycling (equation 26). Investment
in adaptation (equation 28), however, would become more expensive for the young generation.
Overall, the gap between the two generations’ preferred levels of mitigation and adaptation would
widen, but the median voter would still be an individual of the young generation. Compared to
the distortionary tax regime, mitigation (adaptation) chosen in the political equilibrium with
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lump-sum taxation could still be higher (lower), and this becomes more likely (see equation 43
where 2 + n would have to be replaced by 1 + n).
7.3 Delayed Effects of Mitigation
We assumed that mitigation and adaptation in period t reduce environmental damage in the
same period. However, it could well be that mitigation efforts in period t take effect one pe-
riod later whereas adaptation reduces the more immediate damages of climate change. Delayed
mitigation effects affect our results quantitatively but not qualitatively. In this case, mitiga-
tion becomes less valuable for both the old and the young generation, which is why the two
generations (and thus the median voter) vote for a lower ecotax rate. However, the trade-off
concerning the costs and benefits of adaptation remains unchanged. In sum, we obtain a polit-
ical equilibrium characterized by the same level of adaptation investment but a lower level of
mitigation in each period.
7.4 Preferences
An advantage of modeling agents’ preferences with a quasi-linear utility function is that in the
case of lump-sum taxation, heterogeneity among agents is limited to their different time horizons.
We are thus able to contrast our results under distortionary taxation, in which case the income
distribution plays a role, with the standard results in environmental economics where only an
environmental externality is present. Additionally, with quasi-linear preferences, we are able
to capture in the most elegant way the fact that environmental taxation is usually regressive.
Yet, one may argue that the absolute amount of energy expenditures increases with income
(albeit less than proportionally). Such an income effect could be captured by the Gorman-polar
specification as employed in Habla and Roeder (2013). When higher income voters consume
more of the energy-related good than do low-income voters (but at a rate that is less than
proportional to the difference in income), this reduces (increases) the incentives of the former
(latter) to vote for higher ecotaxes. Given that the median voter consumes less of the dirty
good compared to the individual with average consumption, income effects thus mean that an
inefficiently high ecotax, independent of the financing regime, is more likely because the socially
optimal tax rate is oriented at average consumption. Adaptation investment would remain
unaffected by the introduction of income effects in the social optimum and under all other
regimes.
One may also argue that generations are dynastically linked due to intergenerational altru-
ism. Then, the old generation in period t would additionally derive utility from their future
generations’ utility levels. Assuming that the income type is passed on to the next generation,
both the young and old would vote for higher mitigation and adaptation levels because they
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take into consideration the beneficial effects on future generations. Nevertheless, if altruism is
only one-sided, the young do not internalize the impact of their dirty good consumption on their
parents’ utility and on other parents’ offspring. In other words, the political equilibrium is still
different from the social optimum, but compared to no altruism, mitigation and adaptation are
closer to their socially optimal levels.
8 Conclusion
This paper has studied the political economy of mitigation and adaptation investments within
an OLG model. The two climate policy options have different impacts on public budgets; while
mitigation raises revenue, adaptation requires public funds. The mode whereby the government
finances its expenditures and thus recycles ecotax revenues has been shown to be crucial in
determining the political support for mitigation and adaptation investments. When public ex-
penditures are financed via lump-sum taxes, individuals of each generation are, independent of
their income level, equally affected by climate policies. The only difference arises from the differ-
ent benefits of these policies due to an individual’s age. If, by contrast, distortionary taxes are
in place, then higher income individuals profit relatively more from the increased revenue from
mitigation policies, while these voters simultaneously incur relatively higher costs for adaptation
investments. We have shown that if the decisive voter possesses relatively high income, then a
distortionary tax scheme entails higher mitigation and lower adaptation investments compared
to a lump-sum tax scheme (and possibly also compared to their socially optimal levels). When
we observe that countries prefer high levels of mitigation, as in Germany, this may well have to
do with the financing regime and the implied redistribution effects of environmental taxation.
We calibrated our model to the German economy. Our results provide an initial indication
of how the two modes of financing impact environmental quality and social welfare. While
under a distortionary tax scheme, mitigation may be higher for reasonable levels of distortions,
we find that financing via lump-sum taxation yields lower environmental damages and higher
overall welfare. The reason is that adaptation may fall significantly short of its optimal level
in the political equilibrium. In other words, analyses that implicitly or explicitly assume that
a lump-sum tax system is in place may underestimate environmental damages and the loss in
utilitarian welfare.
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Appendix
A.1 Single-peakedness
Note that for the derivations below, the first-order conditions are occasionally plugged into the
second-order conditions. For the social optimum, the second-order conditions read:
SOCa∗ ≡
∂2W
∂a2t
= φv′′(at)
2 + n
1− zA
< 0 , (A.1)
SOCθ∗ ≡
∂2W
∂θ2t
= D′(θt) < 0 . (A.2)
The second-order conditions for the different generations under lump-sum taxation are given by:
SOCOaτ ≡
∂2V Oi,t
∂a2t
= φv′′(at) < 0 , (A.3)
SOCYaτ ≡
∂2V Yi,t
∂a2t
= φv′′(at)[1 + ρ(1− δA)] < 0 , (A.4)
SOCOθτ ≡
∂2V Oi,t
∂θ2t
= d′(θt) < 0 , (A.5)
SOCYθτ ≡
∂2V Yi,t
∂θ2t
= d′(θt) < 0 . (A.6)
For the regime with distortionary taxation, the second-order conditions can be written as:
SOCOab ≡
∂2V Oi,t
∂a2t
= φv′′(at) < 0 , (A.7)
SOCYab ≡
∂2V Yi,t
∂a2t
= φv′′(at)[1 + ρ(1− δA)] < 0 , (A.8)
SOCOθb ≡
∂2V Oi,t
∂θ2t
= d′(θt)
[
−d(θt)
u′′′
u′′
− 1
]
< 0 iff the relative prudence−
d(θt)u
′′′
u′′
> 1 ,
(A.9)
SOCYθb ≡
∂2V Yi,t
∂θ2t
= d′(θt)
[
2
yYi,t
y˜t
− 1
]
+ d′′(θt)
[
θt
yYi,t
y˜t
− (2 + n)φ[1 + ρ(1− δE)]
]
= d′(θt)
yYi,t
y˜t︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
[
yYi,t
y˜t
− 1
] [
d′(θt)− d
′′(θt)
d(θt)
d′(θt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 iff − d(θt)u
′′′
u′′
>1
, (A.10)
where we exploited – for the last two equations – the fact that d′(θt) = 1/u
′′ < 0 and d′′(θt) =
−u′′′/(u′′)3. Furthermore, y˜t ≡ (1 + n)(1− η)y¯
Y
t /(2 + n).
u′′′ > −u′′/d(θt) is a necessary and sufficient condition for equation (A.9) to be negative. How-
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ever, it is not sufficient for equation (A.10) to be negative. Therefore, we assume that the latter
equation is negative for all income levels.
A.2 Comparative statics
For the levels of mitigation and adaptation desired by the old, the following holds:
∂θO,τi,t
∂n
=
φd′(θ)
SOCOθτ
> 0 ,
∂aO,τi,t
∂n
= −
1
(2+n)2
SOCOaτ
> 0 , (A.11)
∂θO,bi,t
∂n
=
φd′(θ)
SOCO
θb
> 0 ,
∂aO,bi,t
∂n
= 0 . (A.12)
A.3 Numerical illustration: Time-varying levels of mitigation and adaptation
To calculate the welfare of all future generations, we first need to derive the future levels of
mitigation and adaptation under all regimes and in the social optimum. It holds true that in
any given period t, mitigation and adaptation levels are determined as described above, as the
proportion of old and young individuals remains constant over time, assuming that the income
distribution also remains the same. However, this does not imply that the politically determined
levels of mitigation and adaptation and the socially optimal ones are not time-invariant. The
reason is that from an individual voter’s and from the social planner’s perspective, the marginal
benefits (and possibly costs) of mitigation (and adaptation) change over time due to population
growth. In the simplest case, let us assume that public expenditure needs to be scaled up
proportionally to population. That is, equations (11) and (17) for period t + 1 change relative
to period t in the following way (changes are in bold):
(1 + n)θt+1D(θt+1) + (1 + n)(2 + n)τt+1 = (1 + n)Rt+1 + at+1 , (A.13)
(1 + n)θt+1D(θt+1) + (1 + n)
2(1− η)bt+1
∫ y+
y−
yYi,t+1dF (y
Y
t+1) = (1 + n)Rt+1 + at+1 . (A.14)
Consequently, equations (13) and (19) also change as follows (while (12) and (18) remain un-
changed):
∂τt+1(θt+1, at+1)
∂at+1
=
1
(1 + n)(2 + n)
> 0 , (A.15)
∂bt+1(θt+1, at+1)
∂at+1
=
1
(1 + n)2(1− η)y¯Yt+1
> 0 . (A.16)
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The first-order conditions (FOCs) in the social optimum at time t+ 1 thus read as follows:
−D(θt+1)− (2 + n)
∂τt+1
∂θt+1
−
(1 + n)(2 + n)
1− zE
φD′(θt+1) = 0 ⇔ θ
⋆
t+1 =
(1 + n)(2 + n)
1− zE
φ ,
(A.17)
− (2 + n)
∂τt+1
∂at+1
+
2 + n
1− zA
φv′(at+1) = 0 ⇔
2 + n
1− zA
φv′(a⋆t+1) =
1
1 + n
.
(A.18)
The social planner chooses a higher tax rate in period t+1 because the marginal environmental
benefits of a tax increase have grown (a tax increase now decreases individual consumption of
all (1 + n)(2 + n) individuals); the efficient level of adaptation investment has also increased
relative to period t because the marginal costs of providing this public good are shared among
more individuals.
The FOCs of an old and young individual at time t+ 1 under lump-sum taxation are:
∂V Oi,t+1
∂θt+1
= −d(θt+1)−
∂τt+1
∂θt+1
− (1 + n)φD′(θt+1) = 0 , (A.19)
∂V Yi,t+1
∂θt+1
= −d(θt+1)−
∂τt+1
∂θt+1
− (1 + n)φD′(θt+1)[1 + ρ(1− δE)] = 0 , (A.20)
∂V Oi,t+1
∂at+1
= −
∂τt+1
∂at+1
+ φv′(at+1) = 0 , (A.21)
∂V Yi,t+1
∂at+1
= −
∂τt+1
∂at+1
+ φv′(at+1)[1 + ρ(1− δA)] = 0 . (A.22)
Similarly, the respective FOCs under distortionary taxation read:
∂V Oi,t+1
∂θt+1
= −d(θt+1)− (1 + n)φD
′(θt+1) = 0 , (A.23)
∂V Yi,t+1
∂θt+1
= −d(θt+1)− (1 + n)φD
′(θt+1)[1 + ρ(1− δE)]−
∂bt+1
∂θt+1
yYi,t+1 = 0 , (A.24)
∂V Oi,t+1
∂at+1
= φv′(at+1) > 0 , (A.25)
∂V Yi,t+1
∂at+1
= φv′(at+1)[1 + ρ(1− δA)]−
∂bt+1
∂at+1
yYi,t+1 = 0 . (A.26)
As in the social optimum, the green tax rates desired by individual voters increase over time
for the same reason as above. The same holds for the individuals’ adaptation choices (except
for those of old individuals under the distortionary tax regime because they do not share the
costs of financing adaptation at all). In period t+2, the terms 1+n in the above equations are
replaced by (1 + n)2, in period t+ 3 by (1 + n)3, and so forth.
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